​Almost all personal coaches have few, if any, impressive credentials. Some have bachelor's degrees; some have "diplomas" from sketchy organizations. Many tout client testimonials, which--if you read the research--are almost worthless.

Bryan has real credentials. He has taught philosophy, physics, logic, and/or cognitive science to entrepreneurs, venture capitalists, undergraduates, Masters students, and PhD students. He has taught thousands of people, face to face in the US, UK, Europe, Asia, and the Middle East.

​He has published many books and articles in philosophy and with the most prestigious presses in the world.

• ​Epistemology: on wisdom and related topics
• Philosophy of Physics: on spacetime, relativity, and how big things are made of small things
• Philosophy of Religion: on what we can know, pro or con, about religious matters
• Philosophy of Philosophy: on what we should conclude about the big questions in philosophy​
• Philosophy of Mind: on thought and experience
• Philosophy of Language: on meaning, truth, and reference

​

BOOKS

• Achieving Wisdom & Avoiding Stupidity, in progress.
• ​Greatest of All Time: a Philosophical Analysis, McFarland and Company.
• The Mystery of Color: W​here Are Colors Located?, in progress.
• Scepticism Comes Alive, Oxford University Press.
• ​The Epistemic Consequences of Paradox, Cambridge University Press.
• An Agnostic Defends God, Palgrave Macmillan.
• Disagreement, Polity Press.
• Gratuitous Suffering and the Problem of Evil: A Comprehensive Introduction, Routledge Press.
• Can We Know Anything?, Routledge Press (with Michael Huemer).​​​


​PROFESSIONAL ARTICLES

• “Everything You Think about Equivocation Is False”, forthcoming in Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia, Special Issue: Philosophy of Language: New Frontiers in Meaning and Use, v. 81 (4).
  
• "Philosophy as Fact-Based Discipline: 200 Philosophical Facts", forthcoming in Philosophical Studies.
• "How Bizarre Philosophy Can Get", forthcoming in Philosophy Now.
• "Thoughts on External World Skepticism", forthcoming in a book to be published in Russia.
• “Knowing that: Your Lottery Ticket is a Loser, the Lottery Is Fixed, or Something Superhuman Happened”, forthcoming in Think.
• “Knockdown Arguments for Philosophically Substantive Conclusions”, forthcoming in János Tőzsér and László Kocsis (eds.) Equilibrism in Metaphilosophy, Routledge Studies in Contemporary Philosophy.
• “How Much Horrific Suffering Is Enough?”, Religious Studies 60 (2024), 290-301.
• “The Unfortunate Consequences of Progress in Philosophy”, forthcoming in Maria Baghramian, J. Adam Carter and Rach Cosker-Rowland (eds.) Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Disagreement, Routledge.
• "Metaphysics, Bullshit, and the Analysis of Philosophical Problems", Synthese 199 (2021), 11541–11554.
• ​"Epistemically Different Epistemic Peers", co-authored with Mariangela Zoe Cocchiaro, TOPOI 40 (5) (2021), 1063-73.
• ​"Philosophical Proofs Against Common Sense", Analysis 81 (2021), 18–26.
• ​“How Ordinary Objects Fit into Reality”, in Non-Being: New Essays on the Metaphysics of Nonexistence, Tyron Goldschmidt and Sara Bernstein (eds.) Oxford University Press (2021).
• ​​​"Religious Disagreement”, in Stewart Goetz and Charles Taliaferro (eds.) Encyclopedia of Philosophy of Religion, Wiley-Blackwell (2021).
• ​"The Epistemology of Disagreement", in Encyclopaedia of Educational Theory and Philosophy, Gerry Dunne (ed.) Springer (2020).
• “Is It Rational to Reject Expert Consensus?” International Journal for the Study of Skepticism​ 10 (2020), 325-45.
• ​"The Epistemology of Theistic Philosophers’ Reactions to the Problem of Evil", American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly, v.94 (4) (2020), 547-72.
• "The Philosopher's Doom: Unreliable at Truth or Unreliable at Logic", in Ted Poston and Kevin McCain (eds.) The Mystery of Skepticism, Brill (2019), 187-199.
• "Justifying a Large Part of Philosophy", Think, 18 (2019), 93-99.
• "The Epistemology of Real-World Religious Disagreement Without Peers", Philosophia Christi, 20 (1) (2018), 291-299.
• ​​"Why the Vagueness Paradox is Amazing", Think 17 (2018), 27-38.
• ​“Philosophical Expertise”, Chase and Cody (eds.) The Routledge Handbook of Applied Epistemology, Routledge (2018), 296-307.
• "Why Afterimages are Metaphysically Mysterious", Think 17 (49) (2018), 33-44.
• “Disagreement”, coauthored with Jon Matheson, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2018 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.).
• "The Atheistic Argument from Outrageousness", Think, 17 (48) (2018), 107-116.
• "Scepticism and Disagreement", in Skepticism: From Antiquity to the Present, Diego Machuca and Baron Reed (eds.), Bloomsbury (2018), 581-591.
• “The Ontology of Some Afterimages”, in Philosophy of Mind: Contemporary Perspectives, Manuel Curado and Steven Gouveia (eds.), Cambridge Scholars Publishing (2017), 118-144.
• “Extensive Philosophical Progress and Agreement”, Metaphilosophy, 48 (1-2) (2017), 47-57. 
• "Worrisome Skepticism about Philosophy", Episteme, 13 (2016), 289-303.
• "Presentism: Foreigner-Friendly or Xenophobic?", Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 94 (2016), 479-488.
• "The Irrationality of Religious Belief", Think, 15 (42) (2016), 15-33.
• “Ontology, Composition, Quantification, and Action”, Analysis, 76 (2016), 137-142.
• "Rationally Held 'P, but I Fully Believe ~P and I am not Equivocating'", Philosophical Studies, 173 (2016), 309-313.​
• “The Dual Concepts Objection to Content Externalism”, American Philosophical Quarterly, 53 (2016), 123-138.
• "Religious Disagreement", in The Routledge Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy of Religion, Graham Oppy (ed.), Routledge (2015), 180-191.
• "The Rationality of Religious Belief", Think, 14 (40) (2015), 109-117.​
• "Knowledge", coauthored with Allan Hazlett, in The Bloomsbury Companion to Analytic Philosophy, Barry Dainton and Howard Robinson (eds.), Bloomsbury Press (2014), 432-452.
• "Philosophical Renegades", in The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays, Jennifer Lackey and David Christensen (eds.), Oxford University Press (2013), 121-166.
• ​Review of Robert Audi, Rationality and Religious Commitment, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (2013).
• "Discovering Disagreeing Epistemic Peers and Superiors", International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 20 (2012), 1-21.
• "Kripke", in Philosophy of Language: The Key Thinkers, 2nd ed., Barry Lee (ed.), Continuum Press (2011/2019), 249-267.
• "The Reflective Epistemic Renegade", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 81 (2010), 419-63.
• "Disagreement", in Routledge Companion to Epistemology, Duncan Pritchard and Sven Bernecker (eds.), Routledge Press (2010), 68-74.
• "Live Skeptical Hypotheses", in Oxford Handbook of Skepticism, John Greco (ed.), Oxford University Press (2008), 225-245.
• "Spirituality, Expertise, and Philosophers", in Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion, v. 1, Jon Kvanvig (ed.), Oxford University Press (2008), 44-81.
• "Externalism, Physicalism, Statues, and Hunks", Philosophical Studies, 133 (2007), 199-232.
• Review of Cynthia MacDonald's Varieties of Things: Foundations of Contemporary Metaphysics, Philosophical Quarterly, 47 (2007), 380-382.
• "The New Leibniz's Law Arguments for Pluralism", Mind, 115 (2006), 1007-1022.
• "When a Skeptical Hypothesis is Live", Noûs, 39 (2005), 559-95.
• "A Test for Theories of Belief Ascription", Analysis, 62 (2002), 116-25, revised.
• "Disquotation and Substitutivity", Mind, 109 (2000), 519-25.
• "On the Explanatory Deficiencies of Linguistic Content", Philosophical Studies, 93 (1999), 45-75.
• "Contradictory Belief and Epistemic Closure Principles", Mind and Language, 14 (1999), 203-26.
• "Defending the Defense", Mind, 108 (1999), 563-6.
• "Defending Millian Theories", Mind, 107 (1998), 703-27. Reprinted in The General Philosophy of John Stuart Mill, Victor Sanchez Valencia (ed.), Ashgate Publishers, 2002.
• "Arguing for Frege’s Fundamental Principle", Mind and Language, 13 (1998), 341-6.
• "The Twin-Earth Thought Experiments", in A Field Guide to the Philosophy of Mind, a publication of the Department of Philosophy at the University of Rome, III (1998).
• "Plato's Response to the Third Man Argument in the Paradoxical Exercise of the Parmenides", Ancient Philosophy, 16 (1996), 47-64.​

I'm willing to test it